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Divided cities present an intriguing phenomenology in urban design where political 
and/or cultural circumstances lead to a schism in an otherwise holistic city. The 
consequence of such division is not only physically present, but also has a long lasting 
impression on communal and individual identity. This impact is further emphasized 
by local architecture and how the border is treated in each side of a division. This 
article uses the island city of Nicosia, Cyprus, located in the Mediterranean, as a case 
study to better understand how borders in divided cities relate to memory and identity 
establishment.
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A
rchitecture is entangled in a web of political, 
social, cultural, and economic powers. As 
a spatial practice, architecture has the 
capacity to reallocate cultural powers and to 
constructively contribute to social change. In 
divided cities, however, architecture is misused as 
an ultimate method of containing and managing 
intercommunal tensions. Giving physical form to 
fear and misunderstanding, these constructs only 
sustain and exacerbate long-standing problems, 
since “physical partition often affirms local 
assumptions about persecution and encourages 
one ethnic community to antagonize another” 
(Calame, 2009, p. 5). Division of the urban fabric 
destroys the essence of place, hinders communal 
identity and sustains distrust as competing groups 
manipulate images of the city and historical past 
for their own benefit. Intercommunal tension 
cannot and should not be addressed by erecting 
of walls, fences, and no man’s lands, but rather 
through open dialogue and exchange. Although 
divided cities are not prevalent in urban history, 
they represent the power of architecture as a 
cultural agency and demonstrate how, if misused, 
they can lead to urban dysfunction and permanent 
division. 
Historically, the purpose of city fortification 
has been twofold: to provide passive security 
against external threats and to inhibit the social 
assimilation that usually accompanies a dense 
and cooperative urban environment. Although 
creating a wall around a city helps with the 
physical definition of a community, it also has 
the power to divide because it draws a distinction 
between those within and outside of the city. As 
Lewis Mumford noted, “physical barricades have 
historically provided a functional separation 
between civilized and uncivilized domains for 
resident communities” (Mumford, 1960, p. 54). 
The city boundary emphasizes social hierarchy 
and sustains prejudice and mistrust among 
community members.
Similar to city walls, permanent or temporary 
partitions in divided cities are constructed out 
of fear and distrust among different ethnic and/
or social groups. In the case of Cyprus, the Green 
Line is a de facto international boundary between 
the self-proclaimed but unrecognized Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Greek-
speaking Cypriots in the south. The partition line 
is about ten kilometers long and varies in width 
between twenty meters and four meters as it runs 
through the urban and suburban terrain. 
“We are destined to get worse, not better, 
for as long as there is the concept of fear 
and siege. So if fear is, at the core, the most 
dangerous emotion… then remove the fear. 
Now, how do you do that? Is it done by walls? 
Is it done by education? Is it done by being 
inventive about how you share the land? I’m 
not sure that I have any of the answers – 
plenty of the questions.”  
-David Ervine, former Member of the 
Legislative Assembly, Belfast, 2001
As cities reflect local demographics in spatial 
form, each city can be perceived on a continuum 
between perfect spatial integration and complete 
segregation. As an example of a divided city, 
Nicosia, capital of Cyprus, reflects total spatial 
segregation between its two ethnic groups. 
Intercommunal rivalry in Nicosia frayed the 
normal urban functioning, resulting in a complete 
schism along its east-west ethnic fault-line. The 
Green Line has been a physical manifestation 
of a long and violent ethnic rivalry between 
the Turkish-speaking Cypriots in the north 
and the Greek-speaking Cypriots in the south.  
To understand the effects of partitioning on 
individual and collective identity in Nicosia, it is 
necessary to first unpack its complex history and 
evolution as an urban city.
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B a c k g r o u n d  o n  N i c o s i a
Historically Cyprus was composed of two major 
ethnic groups: the Greek- and Turkish-speaking 
Cypriots. Although these two groups coexisted 
with tolerance and unity at the beginning, over 
time political events led to conflict and an 
eventual schism between the Turkish-speaking 
and Greek-speaking Cypriots. 
 
Following the Ottoman Empire’s acquisition of 
Cyprus in 1571, the ethnic and cultural schism 
became increasingly apparent. The Ottoman’s 
millet system favored Muslim minority groups, 
resulting in institutionalization of ethnic 
segregation. Consequently, the Turkish-speaking 
residents settled primarily in the northern part of 
Nicosia, while the Greek-speaking congregated in 
the south. The social and commercial activities, 
however, remained open and active between the 
two ethnic groups in the city’s central zone. 
 
British occupation in 1878 further emphasized 
the ethnic segregation by swaying the political 
authority to church leaders. In 1914, Britain 
consolidated its hold over the former Ottoman 
Empire. Following World War I, Cyprus became an 
annexed colony of Britain and eventually a Crown 
colony in 1925. 
Hoping for independence, more than 37,000 Greek- 
and Turkish-speaking Cypriots volunteered to 
serve in various British armed forces during World 
War II. Although many colonies were able to gain 
independence post-war, Cyprus remained a British 
colony due to its strategic location in the Middle 
East (Mallinson, 2005, p. 11). In order to legitimize 
and ensure their permanent presence in Cyprus, 
the British colonial authorities enforced policies 
that formalized ethnic divisions and accelerated 
inter-ethnic rivalries. These external influences 
“tended to disrupt the natural evolution of self-
determination and the emergence of an inclusive 
national identity, aggravating latent antagonisms 
between the Greek- and Turkish-speaking 
Cypriots” (Calame 2009, p. 127). Persistent inter-
ethnic rivalry lasted from 1950 until 1975, leading 
to destabilization and destruction of the Cypriots’ 
natural affinity for tolerance.
Simultaneously, the Greek-Cypriots campaigned 
for enosis (union with Greece) as a movement 
against British colonialism. As anticolonial 
violence directed at police was sometimes 
indistinguishable from inter-ethnic violence, 
tension between the two ethnic groups escalated 
(Calame, 2009, p. 128). In May 1956, the British 
military installed barbed-wire fencing and 
checkpoints in order to prevent Turkish-Greek 
confrontation, but this division only aggravated 
the two communities (Holland, 1998, p. 66). This 
division, informally known as the Mason-Dixon 
Line, was placed east-west through the center of 
the old city and the original path of the Pedieos 
River. In June 1958, the British Prime Minister 
Harold Macmillan proposed the bifurcation of 
political institutions for Turkish- and Greek-
speaking residents.  
In February 1959, recognizing that a shared 
desire to achieve independence from Britain 
overshadowed their differences, Greek- and 
Turkish-speaking Cypriot politicians signed 
the London and Zurich agreement, which 
concluded the ethnic rivalry and established 
Cyprus as a sovereign nation. This desperate act 
of independence proved to be premature and 
short-lived as the newly formulated constitution 
institutionalized ethnic rivalries within its rigid 
quotas. The new quotas “adopted a democratic 
framework for national government without 
having first achieved national integration” 
(Calame, 2009, p. 131). Chaotic conditions and 
persistent violence prompted the British soldiers 
to install temporary physical barricades along 
the Mason-Dixon line. In December 1963, the 
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partition was formalized as “the Green Line,” 
which constituted a double-layered partition line 
between Greek- and Turkish-speaking Cypriots 
with a substantial no man’s land in between. 
Although the purpose of the Green Line was 
to temporarily halt hostilities and maintain a 
ceasefire pending future negotiation, this division 
remained an “unremitting obstacle to progress 
toward normalization in Cyprus more than forty 
years later” (Harbottle, 1970, p. 66-68). In March 
1964, further fortification was installed when 
United Nations peacemakers monitored the 
ceasefire and took control of sensitive boundary 
areas. As a result, Greek-speaking Cypriots in 
the north and Turkish-speaking Cypriots in the 
south abandoned their homes to seek the security 
of a friendly enclave. In most cases, this meant 
crossing the Green Line and leaving their property 
behind.
Unfortunately, the partitioning process further 
encouraged animosity and segregation between 
the two communities. Turkey and Greece, 
concerned about the security of their citizens 
in Cyprus, took military action to protect and 
maintain the divide. The Turkish military took 
control of 37 percent of the island on July 22nd 
1974. Fearing persecution, hundreds of thousands 
of Cypriots were displaced, leading to an almost 
near-perfect ethnic homogeneity of northern 
and southern parts of the island. According to 
the 1960 census, “about 40,000 Turkish-speaking 
Cypriots lived south of the future boundary, and 
approximately 200,000 Greek-speaking Cypriots 
north of it: by 1975 fewer than a hundred members 
of these statistical categories remained. Most 
of the nearly 250,000 refugees participating in 
this demographic reengineering exercise—about 
40 percent of the pre-partition population of 
Cyprus as a whole—received no compensation 
for loss of their possessions, houses, and jobs” 
(Bakshi, 2014, p. 141). The prospect of European 
Union membership for Cyprus and several 
comprehensive settlement plans by Kofi Annan 
(former UN secretary general) in 2004 proved 
futile. Sixty-four percent of Turkish Cypriot voters 
endorsed the reunification plan, but more than 75 
percent of Greek-speaking Cypriot voters rejected 
it (Calame, 2009, p. 139).   
P a r t i t i o n i n g  E f f e c t s
The partitioning effect on Cyprus has been 
significant not only in terms of lives lost, but also 
the number of families that were forced to relocate 
from the mixed regions of Nicosia. More than 600 
Greek-speaking Cypriot families had to abandon 
their homes following widespread hostility and 
intimidation. Continuous violence had a great 
impact on levels of stress, anxiety and trauma for 
individuals and communities. Political settlement 
was further complicated by the fact that each 
group refused to acknowledge the losses of the 
other. As Yiannis Papadakis warned, “if we still 
see ourselves as victims and do not acknowledge 
the pain of others, it would be very scary—we 
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Figure 1
Location of Cyprus in the Middle East and its proximity to Turkey and Greece; 
the Green Line runs through the historic city center dividing Nicosia into two.
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have both been aggressors” (Papadakis, 2002). 
Ignorance and continuous rejection of the other 
group’s suffering perpetuated animosity and 
conflict between the Greek- and Turkish-speaking 
Cypriots. The partitioning effect was not only 
expensive in its construction for both parties, 
but also left lasting psychological and emotional 
scars that have healed very slowly over the past 
40 years.
The partitioning process in Cyprus was most 
disruptive in how it affected the physical fabric 
of Nicosia. The city division led to demoralization 
of residents and inefficiency as many public 
amenities were duplicated across the divide. 
Nicosia’s historic center, previously known for 
its vibrancy and cooperation, was turned into a 
no man’s land (Calame, 2009, p. 141). The Green 
Line eroded the urban market, which had been 
at the heart of Nicosia, leading to job loss and 
displacement of a large segment of the workforce. 
In addition, Cyprus’s economy, which relied on 
agriculture and tourism, suffered significantly 
due to political and economic instability (Calame, 
2009, p. 142). Given Nicosia’s division, many 
institutions, facilities, and services had to be 
duplicated - a process that was costly, hasty, 
and redundant. Economic, social, and academic 
bifurcation in Nicosia led to a period of stagnation 
and perpetuated ethnic animosity.  The biased 
academic system that was established on each 
side of the divide further propagated bigotry, 
resulting in a new generation of Cypriots that were 
engrossed in ethnic prejudice (Calame, 2009, p. 
141). Greek- and Turkish-speaking Cypriots created 
national narratives that omitted or exaggerated 
certain events in support of each community’s 
interests. The national narrative was then 
propagated in schools, persisting in communities 
and affecting the new generation’s perception of 
the past while distorting the older generations’ 
memories.
M y t h m a k i n g  a n d  M e m o r y 
C o n s t r u c t i o n
Nicosia is just one example of a divided city where 
memories are distorted, bigotry propagated, and 
new myths constructed to support a particularly 
biased version of history. In such cities, 
representations of the past are often selective 
and distorted. In contested sites marked by power 
struggles, myth and storytelling are used to 
make rightful ownership claims over a particular 
place. As a result, “other groups currently residing 
there are seen as recent arrivals or as having 
an insignificant presence” (Bakshi, 2013, p. 199). 
National narratives are constructed in order to 
validate the community’s presence. Explaining 
the connection between contested sites and myth 
making, Bakashi notes: “cities are often central 
to ethnonational conflicts, where tailored myths 
and memories are used to lay claim to the rightful 
ownership of certain sites. In this context, spatial 
practices that harness memory become a critical 
part of a purposive reconstruction of the past” 
(Bakshi, 2013, p. 189). Events and time frames that 
do not support the national narration are simply 
forgotten or ignored, while favorable events are 
embellished and proclaimed. Storytelling is a 
powerful tool in communicating past knowledge 
and creating a strong sense of heritage and 
history. Cities that are partitioned as a result of 
conflict often use storytelling to skew past events 
in their own favor.
Images of cities or physical places can be 
manipulated to support national narration. 
The same place within a city can be perceived 
differently depending on one’s associated 
memories. Physical spaces related to painful 
memories can be destroyed, while others are 
celebrated and left as monuments to a heroic past; 
“the physical body of the city is embellished with 
memories that correspond to what is officially 
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remembered or forgotten” (Bakshi, 2013, p. 202). 
Destruction or construction of certain buildings 
can be used as a technique to manipulate or 
reformulate society’s memories. As a result, 
“official policies of erasure are executed through 
the destruction of buildings, and transmitted 
memories continue to influence individuals’ use of 
the city” (Bakshi, 2014, p. 189). 
In Nicosia, the selective remembering and 
forgetting of historical events resulted in two 
divergent myths about the historic walled city 
center, a space that was shared between the two 
ethnic groups in the past. These myths were 
deeply embedded into individuals’ memories and 
were propagated through the academic systems. 
As a result, the historic recollections of the past 
events have different key dates. Greek-speaking 
Cypriots’ recollection of history overlooks the 
intercommunal violence that occurred between  
1963 and 1974 and instead remembers the period 
of unification and peace between the ethnic 
groups (Papadakis, 2005). The school history books 
similarly overlook the 1963-1974 intercommunal 
violence, while stressing the Greek Cypriots’ 
violence, strife, and displacement following the 
1974 Turkish occupation. 
In contrast, the Turkish-speaking Cypriots stress 
the period of war in 1963 as a dark time when 
many were forced to leave their villages to settle 
in the north under Turkish protection. Turkish-
speaking Cypriots celebrate the 1974 Turkish 
intervention, which marks the founding of 
their ‘homeland’ (Papadakis, 2005, p. 149). These 
opposing narrations of Nicosia’s past illustrate 
the prejudices and selective memories of these 
two populations. The nostalgic utopias are linked 
to the periods that align with each community’s 
official memory discourses. Elements that do not 
fit into these narratives are simply left out of these 
imaginative constructions.
Myths also represent social and cultural values. 
Values represented in northern and southern 
Cypriot’s narration have a significant presence 
in Nicosia’s material reality and the way these 
two communities deal with the partition wall. 
Turkish-Cypriots’ desire to forget the time when 
they shared the land with the Greek-Cypriots 
resulted in the erasure and renaming of all street 
and place names. The change in mentality of 
living in exile versus a homeland has manifested 
itself in the way that the Turkish-Cypriots perceive 
the Green Line. They consequently view the 
partition as a permanent international border 
with solid concrete walls and checkpoints. The 
Greek-Cypriots approach the partition rather 
differently. They view the buffer zone as a 
temporary divide, a makeshift construction and 
blockage that would be easy to dismantle (Bakshi, 
2014, p. 201). Mythmaking is a spatial practice 
that functions beyond the fictional space. As 
Wortham noted, “place has an indeterminacy 
and creative potential that can be seized or taken 
advantage of, and prompted instead of swept away 
or denied” (Wortham, 2008, p. 39). Designers and 
architects can accordingly utilize the potential of 
myth-making to inform design decisions in both 
architectural and urban scale.
Places are both real and imagined, based on 
mental association, as well as physical form and 
character. As a result, designers and planners 
Division of the urban fabric 
destroys the essence of place, 
hinders communal identity, and 
sustains distrust as competing 
groups manipulate images of the 
city and historical past for their 
own benefit. 
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have as significant a role in imagined constructs 
of narratives, associations, and rituals as they 
do in the creation and destruction of physical 
spaces (Wortham, 2008, p. 32). The lack of 
diplomatic reconciliations could be attributed 
in part to officials’ inability to understand the 
extent of influence that such imaginary and 
exaggerated narratives have had in sustaining 
the animosity between the Greek- and Turkish- 
speaking Cypriots. Myth is often associated with 
falsehood and fiction, carrying “a dismissive, 
pejorative connotation. However, as a complex 
cultural process mythology can be utilized as a 
method of stewarding and engaging design of 
change” (Wortham, 2008, p. 38). By understanding 
the role of myth as a social construct, designers 
and negotiators can utilize the imaginative and 
physical reality of Nicosia in bringing healing and 
eventually harmony to the region. 
I d e n t i t y  F o r m at i o n  i n  t h e  U r b a n 
S e t t i n g
Cities provide a stable platform for individual 
and collective identity formation. The city, as 
a “confluence of the complexity and density of 
human experience, is a framework for memories 
that are often collective, involving public life, 
Figure 2
Makeshift construction of a northern border by the Greek-Cypriots versus permanent 
materiality of a southern border created by the Turkish-Cypriots.
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social interaction and group identities” (Becherer, 
1984; Boyer, 1994). The perceived stability of space 
in urban cities, or ‘enduringness of materials’ 
based on Paul Ricoeur’s ideology, allows for 
retrieval of the past in the present through the 
conduit of the built environment (Halbwachs, 
1992, p. 57). Cities support and frame memories 
as they provide linkages between the past, 
present, and future through architecture and 
physical forms. Places, as they are seen and 
experienced today, support and create memories, 
while allowing access to images of the place 
in the past. Places may have been destroyed, 
reassembled, or reconstructed to project certain 
meanings, yet these same places still maintain 
potential as points of connection to other histories, 
retaining traces and material evidence of a past 
that may not coincide with official or objective 
documentations (Jordan, 2006, p. 25).
Identity formation is based on the culmination of 
experiences and events throughout one’s lifetime. 
A person’s or community’s past provides a datum 
for evaluating one’s sense of self and identity. As 
mentioned above, one’s sense of the past may 
extend as far back as one’s birth or it may include 
previous generations and heredity. Linkage to 
the past strengthens one’s sense of identity 
through recollection of memories and events. 
Place memories offer a unique opportunity, as the 
history of places and buildings often surpasses 
one’s lifespan: “place-based memories can offer 
people a link to the past and connections to a 
sense of identity—one which may differ from 
national identity” (Till, 2005, p. 32). In addition 
to fortifying one’s identity, place can reinforce a 
sense of belonging and affiliation.
S e l e c t i v e  M e m o r y
The city uses the built form as it witnesses 
and records collective memory. Place memory, 
however, can be manipulated through processes 
of erasure or emphasis. Anita Bakshi’s 2010-2011 
interviews of English-, Greek-, and Turkish-
speaking Cypriot shopkeepers reveal the selective 
recollection of memory in Nicosia before and after 
the partition. The interviewees all lived or worked 
in the walled city between the 1940 and 1970s, and 
many still maintain businesses in the currently 
bifurcated city center. Although these individuals 
experienced the same past, their memories of 
the Greek- and Turkish-speaking Cypriots’ differ 
significantly. One Greek-Cypriot shopkeeper 
remembered serving Turkish customers, but did 
not recall the presence of the Green Line in 1963. 
His earliest recollection of the division was in 
1974, when the Turks invaded Cyprus. Many of the 
Greek-Cypriots denied intercommunal violence or 
any problems whatsoever between the two groups 
and repeated the national narration that violence 
began only after the Turkish invasion. 
The Turkish-speaking Cypriots similarly recalled 
trading with Greek-speaking Cypriots, but 
their memories differed in reference to ‘normal 
times’ or the times before the conflict. Turkish 
shopkeepers’ recollections dated as early as 1955 
or 1963. Their memories related to the time before 
intercommunal conflict were rather limited. 
However, when certain images of buildings were 
shown to the Turkish-speaking shopkeepers, 
they were able to recall spending time in certain 
mixed areas 1963, when the official narrative 
began. These selective memories can be attributed 
to the fact that “memories related to place in 
contested environments are heavily influenced 
by official constructions of the historic narrative 
and mythologies of place which filter down 
Destroying the physical barrier 
and providing space for open 
dialogue can subvert false 
historical narratives history and 
encourage communal healing.
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into individual memories” (Bakshi 2014, p. 203). 
Shopkeepers’ recollections closely followed the 
national narrative, illustrating the strong influence 
of national myths in “forgetting of entire sets 
of memories that fall before the origin point of 
national memory, leaving afloat and inaccessible 
the remembered city that corresponds to that 
time” (Bakshi 2013, p. 203). Photographs and visual 
material related to the everyday reality of place, 
however, allowed people to pull blocked memories 
into the forefront.
C o n c l u s i o n
In the case of Nicosia, the Green Line has become 
a physical manifestation of distrust, impeding 
the nation’s ability to heal and unify. According to 
the work of de Certeau, places are continuously 
constructed and reconstructed through everyday 
actions. As de Certeau noted, “places are the 
warehouses of memory, always haunted with 
myriad of possibilities for meaning and behavior” 
(de Certeau, 1985, p. 131). As disciplinary power in 
space becomes more totalizing, it also becomes 
prone to subversion. Through the dialectics of 
strategies and tactics, mediations of power can 
be reversed and meanings inverted. Architecture 
as a spatial practice can re-calibrate power in 
a community. Destroying the physical barrier 
and providing space for open dialogue can 
subvert false historical narratives and encourage 
communal healing.
Large institutions, social groups, nations, and 
governments do not have a memory but are 
able to create one through the manipulation or 
collection of images, texts, symbols, places, and 
ceremonies (Assmann 2010, p. 55). Urban myths 
are used to restructure urban landscapes in the 
national imagination, and to lend support to 
official historical narratives. In addition, these 
narratives are instrumental in informing major 
urban design, regeneration, and reconstruction 
projects that emphasize or support the national 
myth (Bakshi 2014, p. 197). In the case of Nicosia, 
physical spaces, like historical memories, are 
erased or manipulated to support the community’s 
version of history. These narratives, which are 
passed down over generations, contribute to the 
individual and collective identity formation. Given 
the perceived stability of place, urban architecture 
has the capacity to maintain and store multiple 
times in one location. In divided cities where the 
urban fabric is significantly transformed, memory 
can provide access to what is no longer present. 
Places that are still standing, however, can recount 
history in a more subjective manner. As a result, 
place and architecture become invaluable tools 
in tapping into and understanding hidden or 
forgotten histories.
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